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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Reconversion is a broad concept. This is because modern 
war affects the total fabric of society. The intensity with 
which social energies are channeled into the war effort may 
temporarily obfuscate other social problems but as interna­
tional hostilities come to a close these other tension points 
return. As victory in World War II became apparent, the 
mechanical problems involved in returning a wartime economy 
to a peacetime one became critical. Since the distribution 
of scarce resources was involved, this struggle entailed 
sharp ideological conflict and intense interest group partic­
ipation. In Congress, champions for what was known as the 
"human side" of reconversion emerged, as did their ideological 
counterparts who diligently opposed any sort of legislation 
which they believed would further enhance the New Deal welfare-
state political philosophy which the thirties had brought. 
In Congress, the man who became the leading figure in 
reconversion questions on the side of those forces seeking 
progressive legislation was Senator James Edward Murray (1876-
1962), a Democrat from Montana. Murray, a Butte attorney, 
1 
2 
had scored a comfortable victory to a two-year Senate term 
in 1934, created by the death of Thomas J. Walsh. Murray 
had been overwhelmingly reelected in 1936 by carrying fifty-
four of Montana's fifty-six counties; then in 1942 had sur­
vived a very close contest with Wellington D. Rankin as both 
candidates carried twenty-eight counties.^ 
As reconversion legislation became plentiful, it was 
the War Contract Subcommittee of the Senate Military Affairs 
Committee which handled much of this legislation and in this 
way decided what the content of the bills would be when 
reported out onto the floor. Stephen K. Bailey claims that 
by April of 1944 this subcommittee, operating under Murray's 
chairmanship, controlled every important bill dealing with 
reconversion and post-war matters.^ It was from his position 
as chairman of this subcommittee, and additional chairmanships 
of the Senate Small Business Committee and the Senate Educa­
tion and Labor Committee, that Murray gathered much of the 
authority with which he influenced reconversion policy. This 
study is an examination of this important role played by 
^Who*s Who in America, 1960-61 Volume XXXI (Chicago: 
Marquis Publications, i951J. Ellis Waldron, An Atlas of 
Montana Politics Since 1864 (Missoula: Montana State Press, 
1958), pp. 254-255, 266-267, 298-299. 
^Stephen K. Bailey, Congress Makes a Law--The Story 
Behind the Employment Act of 1946 (New York: Columbia Univer­
sity Press, 1950), p. 33. For information on how Murray's 
committee came to monopolize reconversion legislation see 
pp. 30-36. 
3 
Murray in order to increase understanding about both Murray's 
career, during which he also ardently supported such measures 
as the proposed Missouri Valley Authority, the Small Business 
Administration Act and compulsory health insurance, and about 
3 the development of reconversion programs in Congress. 
What were the issues which provided the focal points of 
World War II reconversion? The three issues with which Murray 
was most intimately involved, and which will provide the topics 
for the next three chapters, were war contracts termination, 
the disposal of surplus government property, and the question 
of federal supplementation of state unemployment compensation 
funds. But there were a plethora of tension points which were 
recognized as part of the problem and the inter-connection 
between them is apparent. Murray and other students of recon­
version realized that the multitude of questions about the 
shape of post-war society were interrelated and that a respon­
sible government would be one which addressed itself to as many 
of them as possible. The problem of determining how many of 
these issues could be incorporated into a single piece of leg­
islation which would be passable in the House and Senate became 
a vexatious one for Murray and his staff. 
^Thomas Payne, "Montana: Politics under the Copper Dome," 
in Politics in the American West, edited by Frank Jones (Salt 
Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1969), p. 219. This thesis 
is based primarily upon that section of the Murray Papers sub­
titled "War Related Functions and Industries." Located in the 
University of Montana Archives, Missoula, Montana, these papers 
consist mainly of executive and congressional reports, speeches, 
newspaper clippings, and personal correspondence and memoranda. 
4 
In addition to the three areas which will be examined 
here, many other facets of the reconversion dilemma can be 
listed, including post-war taxation policies; tariff bills; 
price control; veteran's benefits; housing and public works; 
federal loan policies to business; policy toward labor and 
strikes; and rent control. The war had altered social and 
economic relationships and many new policies were developed 
from 1943 to 1945 to provide a foundation for post-war 
America. 
The term "human side" consistently appears in the litera­
ture of post-war planning. As the name suggests it refers to 
questions of social justice and economic redistribution. It 
is to be distinguished from policies aimed simply at keeping 
the economy functioning at a high tempo. Of course the dis­
tinction is, in part, fallacious: "keeping the economy going" 
is not simply a mechanical process but, like all political 
questions, deals with human values. As far as concrete issues 
were concerned, contract termination and surplus property dis­
posal were considered mechanical types of problems, and 
unemployment compensation and welfare measures were referred 
to as involving the "human side." "Keeping the economy going" 
was a goal supported by all sides. Tracing the progress of 
legislation in the next three chapters will indicate how the 
"human side" represented the more controversial legislation, 
although there were sharp conflicts regarding war contract 
5 
terminations and surplus property disposal. The importance 
with which Murray viewed the "human side" will also become 
clear. 
Though statistics regarding the scope of reconversion 
vary considerably they do demonstrate the colossal size of 
the task which government faced. In August of 1944 estimates 
of surplus property ranged from $50,000,000,000 to 
$120,000,000,000.^ One year earlier a projection showed 
that with the end of the war the United States might find 
itself with as much as $75,000,000,000 worth of undelivered 
war contracts,^ Other studies revealed that about half of 
the $196,000,000,000 gross national product had its frame­
work in war contracts, which showed the pressing need to 
develop economic substitutes for those contracts. As the 
end of the war approached, the rate of contract cancellation 
increased and the lack of termination policy became more 
apparent.^ Murray supposed that V-E day would mean that four 
to five million war workers would no longer be needed, that 
two million people would be leaving the service, and that the 
^U. S., Congress, Senate, Surplus Property Report. 
Report No. 1057, 78th Congress, 2d. Sess., 1944. 
^"Out From Under," Time (August 30, 1943), pp. 86-87. 
[Autho r unknown.] 
6u. S., Congress, Senate, From the Year End Report of 
the War Contracts Subcommittee to the Committee on Military 
Affairs. Print 2a, 78th Congress, 2d Sess., 1944, p. 1. 
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problem would be further compounded following victory over 
Japan as five million men would leave the armed services 
7 
in the first year of demobilization following that victory. 
These figures indicate the enormity of the task of recon­
version and reconstruction. 
Other dimensions of the situation can be brought to 
light through comparison with the World War I reconversion 
scene. Recognizing that the task of reconversion would be 
much greater than at the end of World War I--undelivered war 
contracts, for example, amounted to only $3,600,000,000 at 
that time, which was but a tiny fraction of the projected 
total for the end of World War II--the goal of Congress was 
to establish procedures which would avoid some of the prob­
lems which had plagued reconversion efforts following the 
Q 
earlier war despite the larger magnitude of their task. 
Experience, they realized, should be their guide. 
In part, the problems would be lesser ones following 
V-E and V-J days than they had been in 1918 because conditions 
in general were more ordered as World War II was coming to an 
end. This was the case because national war production and 
the war economy were in a more advanced state in 1944-1945 
than they were in 1918: At the end of the First World War 
''Address by Murray, University of Montana, Archives, 
Murray Papers. That Germany would surrender before Japan 
was a hypothesis of early reconversion planning. 
®"Out From Under," op. cit. 
7 
"blueprints were being drawn up, plants built and initial 
Q 
inventories ordered." This less advanced state of affairs 
made some aspects of reconversion, particularly the settle­
ment of war contracts a more chaotic task than the seventy-
eighth and seventy-ninth Congresses C1944-1945) were to 
face. 
In emphasizing that the World War I experience must 
not be repeated, Murray noted that, as far as war contracts 
were concerned, at the time of World War II unsettled claims 
still remained from World War I!^^ In regard to surplus 
property disposal a report of Murray's Small Business Committee 
suggested that effective coordination was lacking when the May, 
1918 law concerning this problem was established centering the 
power of administration in the executive. This lack of coord­
ination resulted in a situation in which "one government 
agency was not infrequently disposing of a surplus another 
was ordering."^^ Murray also stated, in arguing for the 
Contract Settlement Act, that it would provide a comprehensive 
approach and avoid the confusion which resulted from the World 
War I mistake of having government agencies "act on disposal 
^J. A. Livingstone, Reconversion-The Job Ahead, Public 
Affairs Pamphlet No. 94, Public Attairs Committee, r944, 
p. 15. 
^^Address by Murray, undated, Murray Papers. 
Hu. S. Congress, Preliminary Report of Surplus War 
Property Subcommittee of Special Committee to Study Problems 
of American Small Business. 78th Congress, 2d sess., July 21, 
1944 (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1944). 
8 
1 7 industry by industry." It also needs pointing out that 
the two wars differed in that World War I saw almost no 
government ownership of plants. In World War II government 
had become the largest industrial owner creating disposal 
13 problems which had not existed before. At any rate Murray 
and others were able to approach the situation with some 
degree of historical insight which was to aid them in their 
task. 
One of the reasons why Murray engaged so vigorously in 
reconversion planning was his fear that the end of the war 
would mean the recrudesence of the depression which had 
marred the thirties. Murray was one of those who believed 
that an active federal government could promote the kind of 
policies which would prevent the disastrous effects that 
another depression would bring. He said, "American business 
realizes that another depression such as we experienced in the 
1930's might well mean the end of capitalism in America. 
For Murray an ideal reconversion would mean an economy that 
did not falter with the coming of peace, but rather maintained 
a high level of production; and a society which would provide 
special benefit to those individuals whose circumstances were 
disrupted in the transition. 
1 7 •^^U. S. Senate, Surplus Property Report. Colonel John­
son and Murray for Small Business Committee, 78th Congress, 
2d sess.. Report No. 1057, August 22, 1944. 
13ibid. 
l^Speech by Murray, undated, Murray Papers. 
9 
The question, of course, was what sort of policies 
would build economic prosperity and promote social justice? 
The question brought deep ideological division. In part, it 
was a battle of the new Keynesian-influenced economics versus 
certain older conceptions of American capitalism with their 
lesser degree of federal manipulation. Other familiar dichot­
omies were also present: labor and small business vs. big 
business; and federal action vs. states' "rights." Murray 
and other liberal colleagues consistently defended the first-
mentioned element of each of these dichotomies. Many of the 
arguments were framed in terms of priorities--for example, if 
congressional legislation had permitted big business to make 
exceptional wartime profit and advanced money to corporations 
during the period in which their contracts were being termi­
nated, should government not also undertake increased respon­
sibility toward workers? Other questions were less ideological 
and more pragmatic: At what point is it safe to begin certain 
demobilization and reconversion programs without hindering the 
war effort? How fast can war contracts be terminated and sur­
plus property be disposed of without harming the government's 
ability to protect itself against waste and swindle (economic 
efficiency vs. security)? These last two questions represented 
a balancing of non-controversial and universally recognized 
interest more than any fierce ideological differing. 
10 
Although Murray became the most important congressional 
figure in the area o£ reconversion legislation, there were a 
multitude of other governmental figures who worked on the 
problems. Two other senators who played significant roles 
were Walter F, George CDemocrat-Georgia), the chairman of 
the Senate Committee on Post-War Economic Policy and Planning 
and chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, and Harley M. 
Kilgore (Democrat-West Virginia), the chairman of the War 
Mobilization Subcommittee of the Military Affairs Committee, 
The House had also designated certain committees to work on 
post-war problems. According to Bailey, Senators Murray, 
Kilgore and George and their respective staffs '*spent most 
of late 1943 and early 1944 jockeying for position in the 
race to dominate reconversion legislation," a race which, 
as was noted earlier, the Murray forces won.^^ Although 
the senators tended to engage publicly in the traditional 
senatorial rhetoric of mutual admiration. Bailey wrote that 
there was considerable discord between them caused by both 
jealousy and different conceptions of proper policy. 
The special Senate and House committees together with 
the Baruch-Hancock Report provided the framework and impetus 
l^Bailey, p. 30. 
16Murray, as is traditional, was effusive in his praise 
of his fellow senators. He referred to the preparation of 
the War Contract Settlement Act as a "perfect example of 
teamwork between committees,'* Murray Papers, 
11 
for the reconversion legislation passed by Congress. The 
Baruch team was working, at the direction of the executive 
branch, on solving the same reconversion problems that the 
/ 
special committees were involved with in Congress. James F. 
Byrnes, the head of the Office of War Mobilization, had re­
quested Bernard Baruch to undertake a study of reconversion 
and Baruch had, in turn, asked New York industrial banker 
John M. Hancock to assist him. Their report became public 
17 on February 15, 1944, Although the ideas of the congres­
sional committees and those of the Baruch-Hancock Report are 
quite similar there was a certain degree of animosity, appar­
ently precipated by jealousy, between the congressional study 
groups and the Baruch-Hancock people. CMurray was probably 
much less disturbed by Baruch and Hancock than were certain 
other congressmen, particularly Mr. George.)^® Since the 
work of the executive branch and congressional committees 
were concurrent and contained similar formulas for solving 
post-war ills, it is difficult to judge either source to be 
the one which made the most significant contribution. It is 
true, however, that the ultimate scope and direction of recon­
version were to be determined by vote of Congress. 
l^Bernard Baruch and John M. Hancock, Report on War 
and Po.cit War Adjustment Policies CWashington, IJ.(J. : D"I ST 
Government Printing Office, 1944), 
^®Bailey, p. 32, 
12 
Some of the administrative arrangements which were 
developed in planning for peace were highly original. The 
legislation developed in the Murray subcommittee represented 
some of the most significant change--^especially the tendency 
for Congress to itself direct the functioning of certain 
organs which it had created in place of the traditional 
arrangement whereby such administrative bodies occupied a 
staff relation with the President and functioned at the direc­
tion of the executive.^® The question of the proper balance 
between congressional and executive power was one of deep con­
cern to Murray who thought that action must be taken "to 
restore to Congress a large amount of the control which during 
the war the Congress delegated to the administrative branch of 
government."^® Murray was convinced that Congress would be 
failing the people if it did not stay informed of the activities 
and policies of executive departments. In Chapter 2 it will be 
shown how this idea of an energetic and active Congress inspired 
Murray to incorporate into the War Contract Settlement Act 
^®See V. 0. Key, Jr., "The Reconversion Phase of Demo­
bilization," American Political Science Review. XXXVIII, No. 
6 (December, 1944), pp. 1137-1153. (Hereinafter referred to 
as "Reconversion Phase"). 
^^Speech by Murray, undated, Murray Papers. During the 
war years many fundamental decisions were made by the execu­
tive branch and passed with little questioning or contribu­
tion by Congress. These decisions included the War Powers 
Act, Selective Service Act, Emergency Price Control Act, and 
sundry war appropriations. See Betram M. Gross, "The Role 
of Congress in Contract Termination," Law and Contemporary 
Problems (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, iy44j, p. 540. 
13 
provisions which activally provided for Congressional sur­
veillance an4 knowledge of executive activity. He viewed 
this development as "an interesting experiment in view of 
the traditional attempts to keep our government divided into 
three water-tight compartments."^l 
The perspectives from which Murray viewed reconversion 
policy will be of recurrent interest in this theses. Murray 
saw it as very important for the vitality of a democratic 
government that Congress, rather than the executive, take the 
initiative in developing programs. Secondly, in Murray*s 
judgment the most powerful opponent which the progressive 
? 7 forces faced were the big industrial concerns. He consis­
tently sought policies which would provide increased benefit 
to the interests of labor and of the small businessman. Big 
business, he believed, was more than able to take care of its 
own interests. "Business enterprise," he stated, should never 
"profit at the cost of human misery. 
What is probably Murray's most interesting piece of 
legislation--the Employment Act of 1946--will be mentioned 
only in passing for two reasons: It has been extensively 
dealt with by Stephen Bailey in Congress Makes a Law; and 
it is a broader type of legislation than this study is 
^^Speech by Murray, undated, Murray Papers. 
22Washington Post, July 7, 1944. 
23press Release, June 4, 1951, Murray Papers. 
14 
concerned with. Although, it is clear that the reconversion 
legislation o£ the War Contracts Subcommittee had far-
reaching social implications, the Employment Act of 1946 
was a different sort of a bill in that it was intended to 
establish a "permanent federal obligation, far transcending 
the limited reconversion concepts. Murray felt that the 
reconversion legislation which Congress passed was inadequate 
in terms of its ability to cope with the more far-reaching 
problems of American society. More legislation, like the 
Employment Act of 1946, which was initially intended to 
establish federal responsibility for seeing that every able-
bodied American had a job, was needed to supplement the trend 
toward increased social justice that Murray felt post-war 
legislation would bring.The Employment Act of 1946 repre­
sents a continuation of the same type of ideological goals 
which guided his earlier reconversion work. Murray sought to 
increase the scope of activity of the federal government in 
ways which he thought would better society. 
^^Bailey, p. 32. The extent of Murray's concern about 
big business influence upon national reconversion policy 
leads one to ask questions about his relationship to tradi­
tional corporate interests in Montana. Since Montana is 
viewed as a state where a few corporations such as Anaconda 
and Montana Power exercise an inordinate amount of political 
power, it would be of interest to explore Murray's role in 
helping or hindering these industrial monoliths in the con­
text of reconversion. Unfortunately, that investigation was 
not undertaken in this thesis due to the lack of information 
on such matters in the ''Murray Papers." 
^^Bailey, p. 54. 
15 
The next three chapters o£ this study deal with those 
three areas of reconversion with which Murray was most con­
cerned, and with the legislation he favored towards ame­
liorating those problem areas. In looking at war contract 
termination, surplus property disposal and federal supple­
mentation of unemployment compensation it seems that pressures 
from his Montana constituency had little effect on Murray's 
actions. Although there may have been considerable concern 
about economic conditions in general on the part of Montana 
groups, there seems to have been little awareness of, or 
agitation for, any particular policies such as Murray was 
interested in. On the whole Murray's relationship with 
Montanans in regard to reconversion seems to have centered 
around special favors he could do for particular communities 
or individuals. Murray's personal papers indicate that Mon­
tana people were more concerned with topical issues such as 
temperance on military bases and treatment of Japanese-
Americans in detention camps. It is possible, however, to 
isolate two factors which caused Murray to become so involved 
in these questions; The particular position which he held in 
the committee structure as chairman of the Special Senate 
Committee on Problems of Small Business since 1940 and chair­
man of the War Contracts Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Military Affairs put him in a position to be a leader on 
16 
these issues.The second significant factor seems to have 
been his own particular political animus--as a solid propo­
nent of the New Deal, Murray tried to extend these same 
principles into post-war society. His fear of the recurrence 
of depression and his qualms about the post-war economy in 
general are reflected in his concern for a smooth change-over 
from war to peace. 
^^Who^^s Who in United States Politics and American 
Political Almanac (^Chicago: Capitol House, 1952J . 
CHAPTER II 
WAR CONTRACT TERMINATION 
In September of 1943 a War Contracts Subcommittee of 
the Senate Military Affairs Committee was established to 
consider contract settlement legislation. The three original 
members of the subcommittee were Chairman Murray, Harry S. 
Truman (Democrat^Missouri) and Chapman Revercomb (Republican-
West Virginia). Providing important assistance to the com­
mittee were two staff members: Bertram M. Gross, the direc­
tor, and Kurt Borchardt, consultant. Murray's son, Charles, 
was appointed executive-secretary, 
At the same time the Post-War Planning Committee under 
the guidance of Senator George CDemocrat-Georgia) was also 
working in the area of contract settlement. Since the two 
committees were at work on the same problems Murray invited 
George to be co-sponsor of the Contract Settlement Bill which 
the Murray committee was formulating. George accepted and the 
Murray-George omnibus contract settlement bill (Public Law 395) 
1 
came to the floor of the Senate on February 11, 1944. The 
original goal had been to pass an omnibus bill covering all 
^Bailey, pp. 30-36, 
17 
18 
phases of reconversion; however, since such a bill was bound 
to contain many controversial provisions, including some 
dealing with unemployment compensation, getting it through 
Congress meant considerable delay or, quite possibly, failure. 
So the committee decided to focus its efforts on the passage 
of the Murray-George Bill,^ Although certain liberal ele­
ments were upset at the Murray Committee when it did not 
include any measures to rectify inadequacies in the unemploy­
ment compensation system, the committee's decision is more 
understandable when it is realized that the members had 
I 
labored for eight months on contract termination legisla-
T 
tion and had no desire to see their efforts go for nothing. 
The Murray-George Bill, providing the basis for the 
entire program of post-war contract termination was signed 
into law July 1, 1944 and was incorporated into the Office 
of War Management and Reconversion.^ Although Murray felt 
that the passage of a sound contract termination bill was 
"probably" not the most important piece of legislation 
^War Contract Terminations and Settlements. A Historical 
Record Including the Activities of Contract Settlement in 
World War II. p. 49-50, Murray Papers. (Hereinafter referred 
to as Terminations and Settlements.*) The author of this manu­
script was not mentioned in the work. The report seems to 
have been prepared by some government agency, perhaps the 
Office of Contract Settlement itself. Murray thought the 
history accurate and that its only weaknesses were that it 
did not emphasize the important role of Congress enough. 
^Bailey, pp. 33-34. 
^58 Statute 649, July 1, 1944. 
58 Statute 785, October 3, 1944. 
19 
needed to convert the economy from wartime prosperity to 
peacetime prosperity, he did recognize a termination program 
as the "first essential step toward reconversion." Murray 
realized that a "serious situation" had been created by the 
termination of fourteen billion dollars worth of contracts 
by May of 1944 without the guidance of a sound program. 
Murray felt that the inefficiency of the system then in use 
was pointed up by the circumstance of some contracts having 
been "settled" for a year without contractors having secured 
payments.^ 
Prior to the Contract Settlement Act settlements were, 
for the most part, handled by the various agencies on an 
individual basis as incidental matters to procurement. As 
the volume of terminations increased it became apparent that 
a better procedure was needed. Among other things unfavor­
able criticism was heard regarding inadequate procedures for 
appeal: war contractors, trade associations and governmental 
committees thought that established appeal boards would be 
helpful in answering complaints.^ 
In 1943, in response to the increasing need for estab­
lished government policies and standards, the Director of 
War Mobilization appointed a joint contract termination board 
to tackle the problem. On January 8, 1944 the Director 
^Speech by Murray on Reconversion, undated, Murray Papers, 
^Terminations and Settlements, p. 148, 
20 
announced that a "uniform termination article for fixed-
price supply contracts" was to go into effect at the sug-
n 
gestion of the board. This clause was to be used by the 
various agencies in negotiating contracts and, so far as 
was feasible, was to be implemented into already existing 
contracts. V. 0. Key, Jr. interpreted the clause as having 
"defined the rights and duties of the contractor on receipt 
of a termination notice, adapted the principle that settle­
ments should be made by negotiation and established principles 
to be followed in determining amounts due as an alternative 
to argued settlement."® 
Also, in 1943 the War Department had requested enact' 
ment of a rider to an Army appropriations bill which would 
have given the Secretary of War complete authority to use 
departmental appropriations "in connection with the termina­
tion of War Department Contracts, under such regulation as 
he may prescribe and without regard to any provision of law 
^James Murray, "Contract Settlement Act of 1944," Murray 
Papers. This article originally appeared in the journal of 
Law and Contemporary Problems, op. cit. The basic concepts 
behind the two main types of World War II contracts are sug­
gested by their names--fixed price being an initial settle­
ment establishing the entire cost of the goods and services 
which will be paid by the government; and the cost-plus-
fixed-fee contract being an agreement in which the govern­
ment will pay the cost of the goods and services agreed upon 
plus a designated "reasonable profit," It was this latter 
type of contract which many, including Murray, thought had 
encouraged waste and corruption. 
®Key, "Reconversion Phase," p. 1145. 
21 
relating to making, performance, amendment, or modification 
9 
of contracts. , . To Murray's mind this request was a 
blatant example of the efforts of the Army and executive 
to usurp the rightful powers of Congress. It was Murray's 
firm belief that on matters as important as contract term­
ination policy Congress must be the guiding force. Murray 
thought it much to the credit of Congress that instead of 
mechanically passing the rider it began an investigation 
into the implications of such a request. 
At the same time Murray's Senate Small Business Committee 
began to receive complaints from small businessmen regarding 
termination problems which created further momentxim toward a 
Congressional attack on the inadequacies of the existing 
program.^® In general there was considerable uneasiness 
among the business community regarding the lack of clarity 
in government policy and procedure. It was reported that 
some contractors had opted against war production and had 
chosen civilian production solely because they feared "red-
tape" on the termination date.^^ The result of this lack 
of an effective and recognized policy had far-reaching dan­
gers in addition to upsetting the business world: it was 
threatening the war effort and the economy as a whole. It 
^James Murray, "Contract Settlement Act of 1944," 
Murray Papers. 
lOlbid.. p. 683. 
^^New York Times, March 20, 1944. 
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was into the center of this problem that Murray insisted 
Congress had a responsibility to proceed. 
Since the War Contract Subcommittee was seeking a 
broad legislative solution to the whole problem of termina­
tion the response of that committee to the executive's 
"uniform termination article" was entirely predictable, 
and one with which armed services administrators tended 
1 9 to concur. A Subcommittee report termed the clause 
"welcome" but not a "complete answer" and went on to 
suggest what was really required: 
The scope of the uniform termination clause is 
quite modest. It offers no approach to problems 
of subcontractors. It does not deal with cost-
plus-fixed-fee contracts. It does not clarify 
the role of the general accounting office. It 
does not establish a suitable program for advance 
notice, removal of materials from plant, or for 
interim financing. It does not attempt to deal 
with appeals; the handling of informal, defective 
or quasi-contracts; the type of records that 
should be kept; the development of appropriate 
statistics on contract termination; the detec­
tion and prosecution of fraud; and many other 
items. 
More will be said about the above listed inadequacies 
later, but it might be well to enumerate some general prin­
ciples which Murray felt a well constructed piece of contract 
termination legislation should include, Murray gathered 
^^Colonel David Hauseman who headed the Army's readjust­
ment division in charge of settling contracts believed that 
the job of termination would be much better handled with 
legislation such as the pending Murray-George Bill, Time, 
April 17, 1944, 
^^New York Times, March 20, 1944, 
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ideas for these principles from many sources--the diverse 
Congressional committees who worked on the problem; the 
sizable staffs of those committees; the executive branch 
in the Bari|ch-Hancock Report; numerous interest groups 
including the military, business organizatons, labor, and 
agriculture; and interested citizens who contributed advice 
and suggestions to their governmental representatives upon 
request of the committees or through their own initiative. 
The legislation which Congressmen like Murray authored and 
sponsored depended on all these sources for ideas. 
Murray believed that legislation for contract settle­
ment should impose upon the government and its executive 
the following responsibilities: quick settlements, with 
interim financing between termination and final settlement 
Cwhen properly structured and administered this would, 
presumably, prevent widespread bankruptcy); protection of 
the small businessman; protection of the government's 
interests in preventing overpayments, recovering excess 
payments and preventing fraudreemployment through quick, 
fair and efficient settlement which would create civilian 
^^See the chapter on reconversion in Harold Stein, 
Public Administration and Public Policy CNew York: Harcourt 
Brace and Company, 19 52}, pp. 215-285, Although the Contract 
Settlement Act provided the basis of the termination program 
when it became law on July 1, 1944 much of the groundwork of 
the coming burden of settlements had Been laid by the admin­
istrators in the executive departments. 
ISfjotes for a speech on the War Contract Settlement Act, 
undated, Murray Papers. 
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jobs; and provision for the speedy removal of plant inven­
tories to encourage prompt resumption of civilian activi­
ties.^^ These five principles were central to Murray and 
his associates when they wrote the Contract Settlement Act. 
The contract settlement question proved to be a less 
controversial issue than some others. Senator Vandenburg 
(Republican-Michigan) commented two months before passage 
that "In my view there has ceased to be any substantial 
controversy in respect to contract termination and plant 
clearance as contemplated in S. 1718."^^ Although Vandenburg 
felt that by May controversy had ceased, there had been a 
number of sharp points of disagreement during the formulation 
of the bill in committee and on the floor. What were these 
points of controversy? 
First, there was the question of when businesses should 
be allowed to return to civilian production. Many people 
felt that it would be unfair to permit corporations to engage 
in civilian production in certain areas when their chief 
competitors were still engaged in war production. This posi­
tion was, of course, taken by those industries still engaged 
in war production who saw their business competitors either 
resuming or indicating that they would soon resume civilian 
l^Gross, "The Role of Congress in Contract Termination," 
p. 542. 
^^Quoted in U. S., Congress, Senate. Military Affairs 
Committee Print on Termination of War Contracts, 78th Con-
gress, 1944. 
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production. Even worse, they argued, would be the permitting 
of new competitors to enter the market and take away their 
T O  
business while they were serving the nation. 
At the other extreme there were those who suggested a 
policy of deliberately removing small businesses from war 
production first, in order to give them a head start in 
19 post-war civilian production. Murray*s position was not 
this extreme, but was a laissez-faire attitude which advo­
cated allowing businesses to return to civilian production 
as their war work was completed. The issue proved the most 
volatile in the development of the Contract Settlement Act 
and was the issue on which Murray said the big industrial 
interests most vehemently opposed him.^® 
Secondly, questions arose as to the proper role for the 
Offices of Comptroller General and Attorney General in the 
new legislation. When the Congress first undertook consid­
eration of termination legislation in October of 1943 Comp­
troller General Lindsay Warren informed the appropriate 
congressional committees that he would be opposed to allow­
ing any procurement agencies to negotiate a final settlement 
S., Congress, Senate, Building the Post-War Econ­
omy. From the Year-End Report of the War Contract Subcommit-
tee to the Committee on Military Affairs pursuant to Senate 
Resolution 198, 78th Congress, 2nd Sess., Senate Subcommit­
tee Print 12a, December 18, 1944. 
^^Key, "Reconversion Phase,** p, 1141. 
^^Washington Post. July 7, 1944, 
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until his office had examined and approved the terms of such 
a settlement. Warren made it clear that he felt such a 
policy would not only fail to safeguard the financial inter­
ests of the nation, but would also be illegal. He said he 
deplored: 
a growing tendency on the part of some adminis­
trative agencies ... to vest in contracting 
offices or their representatives final authority 
to adjust and settle claims against the United 
States in degradation of the authority and 
jurisdiction vested in the General Accounting 
Office by the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, 
21 U.S.C. 41.21 
Those who were opposed to giving the Comptroller General 
the authority and responsibility that Warren thought proper 
argued that since settlements were to be made by negotiation, 
and not through the application of accounting principles, 
such a mandatory review would only mean "a re-negotiation 
of a negotiated settlement." In suggesting a much more 
limited role for the Comptroller General they feared that 
compulsory review would serve to slow down the settlement 
2 2 process and, thus, promote unemployment. 
The third key area of dispute involved questions of 
oversight and responsibility: where and how to place the 
proper balance between the powers of the executive and the 
legislative branches, Murray's committee was quite clear 
2^Terminations and Settlements, p. 45. 
^^Key, "Reconversion Phase," pp. 1147-1148. 
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about its desire to increase congressional participation; 
Many government officials prefer legislation 
that deals only with organization and neglects 
the declaration of congressional policies. 
Rather than have the Congress clearly define 
their responsibilities they prefer to operate 
under the incomplete legislation that would 
leave them full powers of direction in formu­
lating basic policies, your subcommittee feels 
that this approach is not acceptable to the 
Congress.23 
It was Murray's deep conviction that Congress must exercise 
its reponsibility of "determining programs and outlining 
policies to be followed by the executive agencies in matters 
such as demobilization and post-war a djustment.Although 
the subcommittee recognized that under the War Powers Act 
the executive was authorized to exercise many powers which 
ordinarily would require Congressional authorization they 
believed that through strong congressional planning the 
country could best be prepared for the return to normal 
congressional policy-making power and the expiration of 
the emergency powers of the executive. 
In other words, Murray's position was that it would be 
a healthy thing for the democracy if Congress took a strong 
hand in the development of reconversion legislation, since 
it would eventually assume much of the power which in time 
of war had been taken over by the executive. Even though 
2 Memo of Murray, September, 1943, Murray Papers. 
S., Congress, Senate, Demob11ization and Post-War 
Adjustment Legislation. Report to the Committee on Military 
Affairs CWashington, D.C,: Government Printing Office, 1944). 
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the war was not over he felt that war contract termination 
was the type of thing Congress could assert itself on 
without harming the national interest. However, some came 
to view the War Contract Settlement Act as establishing a 
type of congressional power never seen before in the United 
States and, thus, as an effort to extend the powers of the 
Congress far beyond their traditional position in the balance 
of power with the executive. 
There was ;;eneral agreement that Congress should estab­
lish policy in regards to contract termination but the pro­
visions which called for continued congressional surveil­
lance to insure that the administrative agencies actually 
performed these policies were questioned,Never before 
had legislation called for "continuous surveillance" and 
some heads of executive agencies feared that such a pro­
vision would lead to intolerable and disruptive meddling 
in their affairs. 
The final version of the Contract Settlement Act indi­
cated that the positions favored by Murray prevailed on 
the three controversial issues outlined above. The decision 
was made to allow businesses to return to civilian production 
irrespective of alleged competitive advantage. The roles of 
the Comptroller General and Attorney General were less than 
^^War Contract Settlement Act. Section 2 (a* b), Public 
Law 395, July 1, 1944. 
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officials would have preferred,And provisions calling 
for congressional oversight were instituted. 
Actually the decision to allow corporations to return 
to civilian production irrespective of competitive advan­
tage represented a continuation of executive policy. In 
June of 1944 the chairman of the War Production Board had 
ruled that contractors could return to civilian production, 
if in so doing they would not harm the war effort, irrespec 
tive of whether or not their competitors were still tied up 
with war contracts. The chairman also decided that new 
firms would be able to enter an industry despite the fact 
that firms who had been engaged in that particular line of 
? fi production may not yet have reconverted. So these impor­
tant points were already government reconversion policy 
prior to the passage of the Contract Settlement Act. They 
provided part of the foundation upon which Murray worked, 
and part of the already existing policy which the Act did 
nothing to alter. 
Given Murray^s general orientation toward reconversion 
and the economy two reasons why such a policy would have 
appealed to him can be discerned. It would tend to promote 
^^Ibid., Section 16. 
^^Ibid., Section 2, The word "oversight" is used here 
to mean "management" or "supervision," 
2®Key, "Reconversion Phase," p. 1142. Key cites a 
War Production Board release No, 5946, 
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general economic prosperity and employment, A War Contract 
Subcommittee report stated that, "If the gross national 
product is high enough after the var-^in other words if 
there is enough productive economic activity--then there 
O Q 
will be jobs for everyone." Since Murray wanted such 
high post-war production he would also encourage a speedy 
return to civilian production to further this goal. It 
may also be inferred that since Murray feared an increased 
control of economic life by giant monopolies following the 
end of the war he would favor a policy of encouraging new 
industries to enter certain areas of civilian production 
7 n 
in order to promote a more competitive economic milieu.*^" 
The role of the Comptroller General was not controver­
sial in an ideological sense, or because it aroused the 
attention of interest groups. It became an issue because 
it raised questions of the government's protecting itself 
against possible fraud caused by rapid return of corpora­
tions to civilian production. The chances of fraud perhaps 
were increased, but the speed of settlement also increased 
when the Contract Settlement Act, instead of allowing the 
Comptroller General to review each and every settlement, 
S,, Congress, Senate, Building the Post-War Econ­
omy. From the Year-End Report of the War Contracts Sub- ~ 
committee on Military Affairs pursuant to Senate Resolution 
198, 78th Congress, 2nd Sess., Senate Subcommittee Print 
12a, December 18, 1944. 
^^Memorandum, January 5, 1944, Murray Papers. 
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directed .that office to investigate selected settlements 
to determine if they were Being made in accordance with 
T 1 
the principles of the act, and whether there was fraud. 
This way the responsibility for settling contracts was 
delegated to the contracting agencies as was required 
given the tremendous volume of contracts that had to be 
settled. That a very limited amount of litigation developed 
out of the settlement of war contracts indicates that the 
law was not a cause of scandal and irresponsibility as some 
had feared. 
Section II of the act provided for congressional over­
sight of the administration of the program which Murray 
thought unprecedented. Congress delegated the responsi­
bility of appraising the reports of the Director of Contract 
Settlement position established by the act) and the 
Comptroller General to appropriate committees in the Senate 
and House. Murray thought that Congress would not meet 
its full responsibility just by passing the needed legisla­
tion and approving the President's choice for Director. 
Follow-through was also important and for Murray this meant 
the added responsibility of seeing that the policies spec­
ified in the law were actually carried out by the executive 
^^Key, "Reconversion Phase," p. 1147. Also War Contract 
Settlement Act. Section 16, Public Law 395, July 1, 1944. 
32Murray, "Contract Settlement Act of 1944." 
^^vfar Contract Settlement Act, Section 4 (a), Public Law 
395, July 1, 1944. 
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apparatus, and that amendments be passed should the need 
for such changes become clear through congressional scru­
tiny, 
Murray believed that this type of continued congres­
sional oversight of the executive's administration of 
% 
legislation was destined to play a very important part in 
the functioning of American government. As society and 
government becamie more complicated he realized that it 
would also become increasingly necessary for Congress to 
confine its role to establishing basic policy guidelines 
for others to apply to concrete circumstances. In Murray's 
opinion a surveillance policy such as the one established 
in the Contract Settlement Act provided an approach which 
would insure that Congress maintained its law-making 
responsibility while also permitting the executive branch 
the necessary degree of authority and discretion to carry 
forth the policies effectively-^^ This system represented 
a pointedly different approach from the usual administrative 
doctrine which placed an office such as Director of Con­
tract Settlement in a staff relation with the President; 
the effect was to allow Congress to exercise many of the 
powers which had typically belonged to the President. That 
this type of legislation would serve to lessen the power of 
34Murray, "Contract Settlement Act of 1944." 
3 5 lb id. 
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the Chief Executive is clear although the President did 
retain that very important right to appoint the department 
head. 
The Contract Settlement Act contained special pro­
visions designed to benefit and protect sub-contractors. 
Sub-contractors were frequently small businessmen and, 
since Murray was chairman of the Senate Small Business 
Committee, it was to be expected that he would show partic­
ular concern toward their situation. Sub-contracting, due 
to technological development, played a much greater part in 
World War II war production than it had in World War I.^^ 
In fact, one syndicated newspaper columnist argued that the 
reason why 72 per cent of all war orders were in the hands 
of one hundred companies was due to extensive sub-contracting 
*T n 
and sub-sub-contracting.*'' 
Murray provided protection for the sub-contractor by 
implementing "quick, fair settlement, speedy removal of 
materials from war plants and proper advance notice."^® Only 
through a broad legislative approach did he foresee these 
goals being achieved. Murray viewed the termination clauses 
in existence while he was working on the Contract Settlement 
Act as conflicting and incomplete, and as providing little 
^^Terminations and Se111ements. 
Drew Pearson, "Washington Merry-Go-Round," in various 
newspapers of Sundays, June 12, 1944. 
^®Statement of Murray, undated, Murray Papers. 
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or no claim against the prime contractor."^® 
As part of the speed-up process the act utilized an 
approach, also recommended by the Baruch-Hancock Report 
which placed responsibility for reaching settlements on 
prime contracts with the government contracting agency.^® 
The "vertical system'* of settlement, the suggested mode of 
negotiation, meant that the prime contractor was to nego­
tiate settlements with his own sub-contractors. This system 
would function when the prime and sub-contractor were able 
to concur on an acceptable settlement; this tentative agree­
ment would then be submitted to a government contracting 
officer, and, meeting his approval, would be an official 
cost which the government would pay to the prime contractor 
in order for him to settle with the sub-contractor. This 
method was accepted largely because the upper-tier contrac­
tor had much more knowledge of the whole settlement process 
than did lower-tier contractors, many of whom were totally 
unfamiliar with its machinations.^^ 
The war-time bureaucracy, seeking to protect sub­
contractors yet realizing the impracticality of a review 
of all sub-contract settlements, developed a pattern of 
checks which provided some efficiency of review and, more 
^^Washington Post, "Murray Asks Control Agency in 
Contracts," December 8, 1943. 
^QWar Contract Settlement Act, Section 6 C^), Public 
Law 395, July 1, 1944. 
^^Ibid.. Section 7 (a). 
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important, required prime contractors to maintain adequate 
personnel and procedures to do most o£ the work of review-
A o 
ing themselves. 
The War Contract Settlement Act continued this basic 
t 
policy of requiring prime war contractors to handle the 
claims of their own lower-tier sub-contractors in order to 
cut down on "red-tape" and to increase the speed of the 
process. However, a significant deviation from this policy-
appeared in Section 7 Ca) of the new legislation; sub­
contractors were allowed to settle their claims directly 
with the contracting agency if that agency "deems such 
action necessary or desirable for the expeditious and 
equitable settlement of such claims." This policy was 
designed to protect sub-contractors against prime con­
tractors who had either "gone broke" or refused to pay 
for other reasons. That sub-contractors seldom requested 
to settle with the government's contracting agency rather 
than their prime contractors indicates that from their 
perspective the vertical system was functioning with some 
degree of success. 
Other sections of the act directed the Smaller War 
Plants Corporation iof which Murray was the founding father) 
to provide these businesses with information in regard to 
J 
^^Terminations and Settlements, p. 102, 
^^Ibld.. p, 115. 
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interim financing, settlements, and removal and storage of 
termination inventories.^^ The Director of the Office of 
War Contract Settlement was required to collaborate with 
the Smaller War Plants Corporation to fulfill these objec­
tives . 
These policies, designed to protect smaller businesses, 
reflected Murray*s concern with their particular problems. 
His attitude was that the big companies could take care of 
themselves but that the smaller firms needed special assis­
tance which could be provided directly through government 
agencies or by requiring the big companies to provide aid 
to their weaker associates. Since the smaller firms did 
not possess the legal resources, accounting staff or finan­
cial resources of the larger corporations, Murray recog­
nized that they would be the ones to suffer first and most 
if Congress failed to produce a fair and effective termina­
tion program. 
One other section of the War Contract Settlement Act 
merits mention because of the contribution it made toward 
increasing economic activity--the sixty day plant clearance 
policy.This allowed the contractor to ask the govern­
ment procurement agency to move contract inventory out of 
44p,M. (New York City), January 14, 1944. 
^5war Contract Settlement Act, Section 20 Cg) and 
21 Cb), Public Law 395, July 1, 1944. 
11,id., Section 12. 
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the plant; and if the government did not perform this func­
tion within the sixty-day limitation the contractor was 
allowed to provide for the storage of equipment at govern­
ment expense. This policy was also proposed in the Baruch-
Hancock Report and was a provision Murray undoubtedly 
favored because, combined with interim financing, it would 
allow plants to adapt to peace production more rapidly, and 
thus contribute to maintaining a high gross national product 
and a low unemployment rate.^^ 
Although important new processes were added to the con­
tract termination programs in the spring of 1945, they 
merely helped expedite and did not alter the basic policies 
of the Murray committee*s War Contract Settlement Act, The 
legislation filled the need for a broad, effective approach 
to the confusion of termination. Since the Baruch-Hancock 
Report recommended so many of the same policies which 
appeared in the War Contract Settlement Act it is evident 
that if the executive branch had continued to establish 
policy in the areas of contract termination its approach 
would not have been radically different from that of Con­
gress, and it would have been implemented sooner (the War 
Congract Settlement Act was not passed until over five 
months after the Baruch-^Hancock Report was made public) . 
^^Baruch and Hancock, Report oh War and Post-War 
Adiustmeht Policies, p. 13. 
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Yet to supporters of a strong Congress like Murray it would 
have been inimical to the nation in the long run if Congress 
did not assert itself as the law-making body which the 
Constitution intended it to be and set policy in such an 
important sphere as reconversion policy. Those policies 
which appeared in the War Contract Settlement Act (and in 
the Baruch-Hancock Report) that were designed to aid the 
small businessman were, in part, a reflection of the increas­
ing fear of big business dominance.^® Murray's view was 
that this dominance had been accelerated during the war as 
many new facilities had been constructed at government ex­
pense and then turned over to large corporations to operate.^® 
His opinion was that government had done enough to aid big 
business and should now turn its attention to assisting those 
less prosperous members of the business community. Murray 
was convinced that those who opposed his termination policies 
were representing the "big industrial interests."^® However, 
this opposition seems to have been somewhat limited--the 
legislation was recognized as an essential program, and after 
early quarrels, came to be regarded as a relatively uncon-
troversial piece of legislation. The ease with which it 
carried the day in both the House and Senate, and the fact 
^^Ibid.. p. 38, 
^^Speech by Murray, undated, Murray Papers. 
^^Washington Post. July 7, 1944, 
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that it enjoyed strong e:xecutive support, speak to its high 
popularity. 
For James E, Murray contract termination was only the 
beginning. He saw reconversion as a number of related 
problems and it was toward the solution of other problems 
that he continued to devote his energy. 
^^Donald H. Riddle, The Truman Committee. A Study in 
Congressional Responsibility. CNew Brunswick: N.J.: Rutgers 
University Press, 1964), p. 160. "[The] long advocacy of 
spreading contracts geographically and among small pro­
ducers . . . had the support of virtually all Congressmen." 
F.D.R. approved the bill on July 1, 1944. Vice-
President Truman was one of the original members of the 
War Contracts Subcommittee and helped to formulate the bill. 
Christian Science Monitor, July 10, 1944. 
Murray claimed the Act passed the Senate unanimously. 
Address by Murray, xindated, Murray Papers. 
CHAPTER III 
SURPLUS PROPERTY DISPOSAL 
Murray believed that the establishment of a war con­
tract settlement policy necessitated a companion bill on 
the question of surplus property disposal,^ Murray was 
actively involved in this area as a member of the Surplus 
Property Subcommittee of the Senate Military Affairs Com-
2 mittee and of the Small Business Committee, The policies 
which he stood for in regard to surplus property disposal 
closely paralleled his stand on war contract termination. 
In addition to examining some of these policies as they 
relate to the Surplus Property Bill this chapter will 
also touch upon the relationship between war surplus. 
Senator Murray, and his Montana constituency. 
The "Surplus Property Act of 1944" superceded Executive 
Order 9425 which had established a Surplus War Property Admin­
istration under a single head. The new law established a 
three-man Surplus Property Board which was to be appointed 
by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
^Memo, undated, Murray Papers. 
2u, S., Congress, Senate,^ "Surplus Property Report. 
Report No, 1057, 78th Congress, 2nd Sess., August, 1944. 
Letter from Murray to E, J, Hornick, Associate Director of 
Community .Chest, Washington, D.C,, April 10, 1946, Murray Papers, 
40 
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This board was to function, like the Director of Contract 
Settlement, under the general supervision of the Office of 
A 
War Management and Reconversion, It possessed the power to 
designate agencies for the disposal of surplus property.^ 
Like the War Contract Settlement Act the Surplus Prop­
erty Disposal Act was directed toward promoting a smooth and 
rapid industrial transition to peacetime. It established 
machinery and procedures for the government to follow in 
expediting the disposal of surplus war property; and it 
established ground rules to be followed by the Surplus 
Property Board and the disposal agencies.^ It was designed 
to avoid uncontrolled dumping and sales to speculators.^ 
Murray saw the law as a way to avoid the establishment of 
government owned Army and Navy stores which he thought had 
been an undesirable nuisance after World War I.^ 
' V. 0. Key, Jr. wrote that "In terms of enduring effect 
on the economy the disposal of government surplus plants, 
machinery and other property was probably the most significant 
element in reconversion , . . the groups concerned manifested 
a most earnest and devoted attention to the development of 
public policy on surplus property." The decision that the 
^U. S., Congress, CongressidhaT Digest, December, 1944, 
p. 294. 
^Surplus Property Disposal Act. Public Law 457, Octo­
ber 3, 1944. 
5u. S., Congress, Senate,' Surplus Property Report,' dp. cit. 
^Key, "Reconversion Phase," p. 1148. 
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government was to dispose of the property Ce^cept in some 
instances where the government would lease plants) was made, 
according to Key, during the summer of 1944.^ The important 
questions of: when? and to whom? remained, and it was these 
questions that Murray and others began to study. 
The Surplus Property Disposal Act provided that certain 
specific preferences were to be a part of any regulation that 
the Surplus Property Board would write: the federal govern­
ment was to have priority over all others in acquiring surplus 
property--this would facilitate the transfer of surplus prop-
O 
erty from one government agency to another. After the fed­
eral government the state and local governments and non­
profit institutions were to have priority in purchasing sur­
plus property. In the case of certain classes of property 
the former owners were to have re-purchase priority rights.® 
Veterans were to have prescribed regulatory advantage in 
obtaining surplus property "to establish and maintain their 
own small business, professional or agricultural enterprises." 
And, as with contract termination, the Smaller War Plants Cor­
poration was legally obligated to aid small businessmen in 
^Surplus Property Disposal Act, Public Law 457, Octo­
ber 3, 1944. SectTorTTz Ca} . 
^Ibid., Section 13, 
^Ibid,, Section 23« 
^°Ibid,. Section 17, 
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acquiring surplus property. 
This question of priorities was o£ particular interest 
to Murray. He claimed to have been "instrumental in obtain­
ing inclusion in the Surplus Property Act of the section 
which requires that surplus property be sold Or disposed to 
public health institutions under a priority system. 
Though the legislation did provide for such a priority in 
that disposals were to take place in such a way that non­
profit institutions were to be given "an opportunity to ful­
fill, in the public interest their legitimate needs," it also 
called for "good recovery to governmentThus the law 
contained conflicting objectives. It was such conflicts 
within the new legislation that led some, including President 
1 A * 
Roosevelt, to consider it awkward. ^ 
After the new legislation went into effect Murray, 
realizing the conflict in objectives, sought more liberal 
policies in its administration which would permit public 
health and educational institutions "to obtain surplus prop­
erty at nominal prices or prices to include only the cost of 
care, handling and transportation."^^ When the War Assets 
IJ-Ibid. , Section 18. 
l^Letter from Murray to S. W, McCullum, May 3, 1946, 
Murray Papers. 
Surplus Property Disposal Act. Section 13 Cc), and 
2 .  
^^P.M. CNew" York City), November 13, 1944. 
ISLetter from Murray to Frank W. Wiley, Director, Mon­
tana Aeronautics Commission, April 8, 1946, Murray Papers. 
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Administration announced that it had a plan to provide a 
95 per cent discount from the fair value of surplus goods 
(not in excess of three thousand dollars) sold to public 
health and educational institutions, and that when the 
items exceeded three thousand dollars then the 95 per cent 
discount might still be allowed subject to the discretion 
of the War Assets Administrator, Murray announced his whole­
hearted approval as he had been urging the War Assets Admin­
istrator to take such a step "for many months.It should 
be noted that earlier Murray drafted a bill which would have 
made surplus property available to educational institutions 
free of any charge. Murray again identified special interest 
groups as the opposition-- it was the dealers in supplies to 
schools who had protested the measure and prevented in from 
carrying.^^ Although Murray believed he had made a contribu­
tion toward guiding administrative policy in the direction of 
aiding educational and charitable institutions, in March of 
1946 he described the act as a failure insofar as veterans 
were concerned; he held that it had not provided the assis­
tance to the veteran which was justified.^® 
S., Congress, Senate, Senate Small Business Com­
mittee Release, May 29, 1946, 
^^Letter from Murray to Wilda jFullerton, Struthers, 
Ohio, December 6, 1944, Murray Papers, 
l^Letter from Murray to John L, Cossitt, Decker, Mon­
tana, March 9, 1946, Murray Papers, 
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Like the contract settlement legislation the Surplus 
Property Disposal Act reflected a special concern for small 
business. It called upon the Small War Plants Corporation 
to cooperate with the Surplus Property Board towards the 
ends of: purchasing property for resale to small busi­
nesses; guaranteeing loans to small businesses in connection 
with the acquisition of surplus; conferring with small busi­
ness to determine its needs and presenting information to 
\ n g 
the agencies and to the business world. In order to help 
prevent monopolies the law also contained a section requiring 
that the Attorney General be notified of any disposition over 
2 0 one million dollars. Murray favored all these provisions 
just as he did for contract termination and was an influential 
force in their becoming public policy. 
Murray would have liked to have included a policy of 
congressional oversight of the administration of the surplus 
property legislation even stronger than the policy set forth 
in the contract termination bill, but this was not to be. 
In a report Murray issued on August 22, 1944, he recommended 
a section which would have provided that two members of each 
house of Congress should attend Surplus Property Board meet­
ings and report to their respective houses on the proceed-
Surplus Property Disposal Act, Section 18. 
2 0lbid., Section 20, 
21 Various speeches by Murray, Murray Papers. 
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ings.22 The War Contract Settlement Act called for periodic 
reports on the new agencies created by Congress, but it did 
not go so far as to establish congressional representation 
at agency meetings. The Surplus Property Disposal Act as 
originally passed by the Senate did include such a provision, 
and Murray favored it because he believed it would help 
2 restore to Congress its rightful post-war powers. Such 
a Congressional "sit-in" right was not, however, contained 
in the final statutes, having been eliminated in a later 
stage of the law-making process, probably on the grounds 
that it would have meant burdensome and intolerable meedling 
in the bureaucratic process. It was likely believed that it 
would have been a waste of time for congressmen to attend 
board meetings, and that the goal of keeping track of execu-
/ 
tive and administrative activity could be accomplished in a 
more practical manner. Still the concept of surveillance 
was made explicit in the act in a section requiring reports 
to Congress explaining how the administration of the law was 
consistent with the spirit. 
Other administrative problems involving surplus property 
disposal gained Murray's attention. 
One of these problem areas involved the men President 
Roosevelt had appointed to administer disposal. Many liberals 
22u. S,, Congress, Senate, Surplus Property Report, 
No, 16, 78th Congress, 2nd Sess,, August ZZ, 1944. 
^^Speech by Murray, undated, Murray Papers, 
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found the Roosevelt appointees ideologically unacceptable. 
Some Congressional observers had decided that when the 
Senate Military Affairs Committee decided that a board should 
replace the single head who had been in charge of the Surplus 
Property Administration it was, more than anything, an attempt 
to get rid of William L. Clayton, a man they considered some­
what unenlightened and reactionary. This negative attitude, 
which Capitol Hill observers believed the committee members 
harbored towards Clayton, was expressed opeilly by people 
like James G. Patton, president of the National Farmers Union, 
who issued a statement calling for Roosevelt to remove Clayton 
on the grounds of his "demonstrated hostility to the true 
interests of farmers, of small businessmen, and of labor. 
Since Murray and Patton possessed similar liberal ideologies, 
as evidenced by their close working relationship on legisla­
tion like the Employment Act of 1946, it is safe to assume 
Murray held no great love for Clayton's policies. Whatever 
the reasons for the Committee's opting for a board it would 
not have been smart politics to say that it was being done 
to get rid of Clayton and his policies.More support would 
be forthcoming if the decision could be justified on grounds 
less ideological, which is the course the senators took. 
They said that the job would involve too much power for any 
24^ew York Times, August 19,1944. 
^^Bailey, pp. 21-^23, 
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one inan--making the question one o£ power per se rather than 
2 6 one of any particular goals of power. 
The problem did not end here-^-Roosevelt appointed 
Clayton to the new board as well. Doubly disturbing to 
some of the liberals was the appointment of Jesse H. Jones 
to the board, a man who, in Patton's opinion, was like 
Clayton in that he disliked the "provisions which aid small 
business and co-operatives." Their appointments to the 
three-man board was a circumstance which Patton saw as 
"very disturbing for every liberal who worked for the re­
election of Roosevelt." Trying to demonstrate their big 
business interests Patton derisively referred to the Roose­
velt appointees as the "tycoon of Te:xas" and the "world's 
7 7 largest cotton factor," Murray had sought various avenues 
to mitigate big business domination including advisory com­
mittees of various economic interests in society (labor, 
farm, small business, big business, etc.) to the reconversion 
28 programs. 
Murray had, of course, been cognizant of Montana's 
particular economic difficulties during World War II. The 
war boom had brought somewhat of a reverse effect upon the 
state. As the war began unskilled workers had left Montana, 
^^New York Times, August 19, 1944. ^ 
^^P.M. CNew York City], November 13, 1944. 
S,, Congress, Senate,' Surplus Property Report. No. 
1057, 78th Congress, 2nd Sess., August 22, 1944, 
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which had no sizable war industry, to go to the west coast 
and other parts of the nation to work in war plants. Murray 
catalogued some of the problems which made Montana's situation 
more critical economically than most other states: "high 
labor costs, high fuel costs, high transportation costs, 
greater distance between cities, no large towns, a loss of 
18 per cent of the population in the past three years because 
of no war industries in the state, weather fourteen degrees 
below zero on the fourteenth of March, 1944, all of these 
make a difference. 
In light of these special economic difficulties it 
was important that Murray try to secure for Montana the ut­
most benefit in post-war programs like Surplus Property 
Disposal. Such programs would have to operate at an accel­
erated tempo if people were to be brought back into Montana 
and a viable post-war economy attained. In this area, 
especially in regard to surplus property, Murray seems 
to have performed well. On January 30, 1947, he was able 
to claim: 
I have held a series of conferences here 
in Washington with top-ranking WAA officials, 
and I have finally been successful in persuad­
ing them that instead of reducing services and 
facilities of the WAA in Montana, they should 
be kept as at present in order that our 
O Q 
^^Statement by Murray regarding the Office of Price 
Administration, undated, Murray Papers. 
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veterans and small businessmen may have every 
opportunity to purchase surplus property items 
critically needed to conduct their business 
and farming operations in the state. . , . 
Colonel Rutten C6th Zone Administrator) had 
been most co-operative and he is acting 
promptly to dispatch surplus property into 
Montana for disposal to veterans and small 
businessmen there. I am highly gratified 
by the success of our mutual efforts to'main­
tain, and, if possible, expand the WAA dis­
posal program in our state, 
It seems fair to say that of the three areas of reconversion 
covered in this study Murray's work in surplus property had 
the most benefit for Montanans, certainly the most!immediate 
benefit. 
30press Release, January 30, 1947, Murray Papers. 
WAA - War Assets Administration, 
CHAPTER IV 
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 
With the question of unemployment compensation one 
moves clearly over to the "human side" o£ reconversion. 
Although liberals like Murray had inserted provisions into 
the War Contract Settlement Act and Surplus Property Disposal 
Act which served to benefit the interests of small business­
men, charitable and educational institutions, against those 
big business interests which they saw as opposing their work, 
it is in the battle for extending the New Deal in the form 
of increased unemployment compensation and the instituting 
of national health insurance that the more volatile contro­
versies occurred. Murray viewed the War Contract Settlement 
Act and the Surplus Property Disposal Act as "purely transi­
tory measures--yes, important transition measures, but 
nothing more,"^ Murray^s position, as he stated in August 
of 1944, was that Congress had already taken action to aid 
business: "our corporations are to be repaid their previous 
two years of tax payments at the rate of eighty-one cents on 
every dollar of loss;" and had enacted legislation to aid the 
^James Murray, "A Practical Approach," American Polit­
ical Science Review, XXXIX, No. 6 CDecember, 1945), p. 1122. 
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farmer. Now, he believed, it was important to act to aid 
the unemployed. He argued that if Congress would enact 
legislation to strengthen unemployment compensation it would 
be put to productive use, whereas these other benefits which 
Congress had decided to bestow might not be. 
This chapter will not deal with the Employment Act of 
1946 which, although closely related to the question of 
increasing state unemployment compensation with a federal 
supplement, is a separate and later issue; and one which 
went far beyond the scope of reconversion. Nor will it be 
concerned with the Murray-Wagner-Dingell Bill which was de­
signed to establish, among other things, a federal system 
of medical and hospitalization benefits. Though a very 
interesting legislative effort it too was not intended as 
a reconversion measure--in fact opponents of the measure 
saw it as an attempt to establish a "cradle-to-the-grave" 
welfare system like the British Beveridge Plan. Also it 
might be mentioned that Murray claimed little involvement 
in the formulation of the Murray-Wagner-Dingell Bill refer­
ring to Robert Wagner (Democrat-New York) as its author.^ 
^Address by Murray in the U. S. Senate, August 9, 
1944, Murray Papers. 
^U. S., Congress, Congressional Digest, December, 1944, 
p. 297. Murray-Wagner-Dingell Bill, Senate Resolution 1161, 
House Resolution 2961, 1944. 
^P.M. (New York City), January 14, 1944-
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Unlike the previous two chapters this one is largely 
a study of failure--the failure of Murray and his liberal 
colleagues to win the support of the majority and their 
fellow Congressmen, Since this chapter does deal with a 
more controversial issue than the other two that have been 
examined it will also be characterized by arguments of a 
more deceptive nature--what Murray favored, and what his 
opponents wanted to make it appear he favored, frequently 
appear as two different'commodities. 
In the second chapter, it was explained how the plan 
to have one comprehensive measure covering all of the recon­
version problems fell through for diverse reasons.^ Since 
this was the case the question of further federal provision 
for the demobilized war worker was one of those problems 
which had to be approached individually. Toward this end 
Harley M. Kilgore C^emocrat-West Virginia) and Murray were 
among the Congressmen who offered bills.^ Rather than analyz 
ing the bills in terms of their progress in the law-making 
process the emphasis here will be on their substantive con­
tent and the highly opinionated positions which were taken 
both pro and con. 
When the Social Security Act was amended on October 3, 
^Supra., p, 18. 
^U. S,, Congress, Congressional Digest, December, 1944, 
p. 291. 
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1944 with the signing into law o£ the War Mobilization and 
Reconversion Act known as the "George Bill") part of 
the national program it created involved placing additional 
responsibilities upon the executive to provide re-training 
and re-employment.^ The law also guaranteed the solvency 
of state unemployment benefit funds in the event that the 
stress of reconversion should place a great burden on those 
O 
funds. Though these changes had definite appeal to the 
liberal "bloc" in Congress that group still saw a need for 
greater federal initiative in meeting the unemployment 
problems of reconversion. President Roosevelt, in signing 
the bill, expressed some of this concern when he listed what 
he considered crucial omissions. Roosevelt issued a state­
ment containing three inadequacies which he felt should be 
covered by further legislation: unemployment compensation 
should be provided for federal employees; travel pay should 
be provided for discharged workers to their homes or new jobs; 
and minimum unemployment compensation standards should be 
established. There had been a battle to include all three 
of these positions in the War Mobilization and Reconversion 
Act but all three had been thrown out: the original version 
passed by the Senate contained provisions for extending 
unemployment compensation to federal employees and for paying 
^Social Security Act, Public Law 458. October 3, 1944, 
Title III. 
^Ibid., Titles IV and XIII. 
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transportation costs for federal workers to their homes or 
new jobs, but these sections were deleted by the House; 
minimum standards to be paid by state agencies were defeated 
by both the Senate and House,^ Murray, functioning in his 
familiar role as a leader of the liberal forces, had offered 
an amendment to the War Mobilization and Reconversion Act 
which would have established federal standards for unemploy­
ment compensation if it had won acceptance. Directing a 
threat toward those interests which he was convinced were 
opposing his efforts, Murray suggested that if the liberal 
reforms were not passed by Congress then perhaps it was time 
to eliminate some of the post-war legislation to aid cor­
porate interests. 
Losing the fight for many of the measures which they 
would have liked to have seen in the War Mobilization and 
Reconversion Act, Murray and other liberals did not give up. 
Among the bills which they later introduced was Senate Resolu­
tion 1274. Sponsored by Murray this was a bill to amend the 
War Mobilization and Reconversion Act in order to meet those 
same needs for which Roosevelt felt the original law should 
have provided. It called for federal funds to be used to 
supplement unemployment compensation which was payable under 
^U. S., Congress, Congressional Digest, December, 1944, 
p. 295. 
^^Address by Murray in the U. S, Senate, August 9, 1944, 
Murray Papers. 
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state laws, unemployment compensation for federal workers, 
and transportation allowances for war workers. Had the 
amendment been passed it would have been in effect from 
the fifth Sunday after enactment until June 30, 1947.^^ 
Although Murray was at the time accused of favoring 
legislation which would have federalized the system of 
unemployment compensation, he argued that Senate Resolution 
1274 was an emergency measure to meet an emergency situation 
brought about by the war. The chief objective was to improve 
what its proponents saw as inadequate and unequal state pay­
ments. The liberals, fearing extensive unemployment follow­
ing the war, reasoned that since the war was a national effort 
the federal government must take the responsibility of pro­
tecting individuals discontinuing war work.^^ Murray con­
sidered the cost of such human aspects of reconversion to be 
just as legitimate a cost of war as any other undertaken by 
the federal government. 
HAs established under the Social Security Act of 1935 
unemployment compensation was supported by a payroll tax of 
3 per cent which was being turned back over to the states to 
be administered by them the federal administrative 
expenses). Social Security Act, Public Law 271, August 14, 
Title III. 
12u. S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, Septem­
ber 19, 1945, p. 8812; Congressional Digest, December, 1944, 
p. 291. 
S., Congr ess. Senate. Emergency Unemployment Com­
pensation . Report No. 565 from the Committee on Finance 
pursuant to Senate Resolution 1274, Mr. George, Chairman, 79th 
Congress, 1st Sess., p. 2. (Hereafter referred to as Unemploy­
ment Compensation. Report No. 565.) 
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As originally presented the amendment contained a 
"mandatory provision" whereby individuals were to receive 
a twenty-five dollar a week maximum benefit from the state, 
or if the state chose not to enter into an agreement with 
the federal government in order to receive the federal 
funds (as was to be the right of the states), then the 
additional supplement could go directly to the individual 
recipient from the Director of War Management and Recon­
version. Benefits would still have been related to an 
individual's prior earnings and the only intended change 
was to give recognition to the low ceilings which some states 
had set.^^ What this would have meant was that the federal 
government would enter into the administration of increased 
benefits only if the states did not choose to participate 
and handle the administration themselves. It was in regard 
to this "mandatory-provision" that some interesting legal 
arguments were presented, legal arguments which the Senate 
Finance Committee gave as their reason for deleting the 
provision from the amendment. 
This legal quagmire developed when the Finance Committee 
contacted state officials in order to get their legal opin­
ions regarding the ability of the states to participate in the 
effort to establish the twenty-five dollar weekly maximum 
^^Press release of Senator Kilgore on Emergency Recon­
version Unemployment Bill, introduced jointly by Murray, 
Wagner (N.Y.), Thomas (Utah), Guffey (Penn.), and Pepper 
(Florida), July 17, 1945, Murray Papers, 
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benefit payment, either through voluntary agreement or through 
direct payment by the Director of War Mobilization and Recon­
version. The replies ran strongly to the negative: of the 
states replying twenty reported they could not enter into 
such an agreement without the consent of the state legisla­
tures (obtaining the permission of the state legislature 
would, in many cases, have entailed special problems such 
as the calling of special sessions), seven expressed doubt 
that they could, while seventeen said they could. A second 
and related question must have proven just as disillusioning 
to the supporters of the amendment: Regarding the proposal 
that direct payments be made by the Director to the unemployed, 
thirty-five states, speaking through their governors or 
attorney generals, asserted that such an arrangement would 
disqualify workers from state benefits, seven said it would 
not, and the balance failed to reply. The Finance Committee, 
under Senator George's chairmanship, accepted the testimony 
from the states at face value and rejected the "mandatory 
provision," reaching the conclusion that "State laws, in 
the last analysis, must be interpreted by state officials 
and state courts. 
15u. S. Senate, Unemployment Compensation, Report No. 
565. Among those states wnich asserted that payments would 
have to be reduced were Montana, the home state of co-sponsor 
Murray, West Virginia, the home state of co-sponsor Kilgore, 
and Missouri, the home state of another strong supporter of 
the amendment former senator and now President Truman I 
Los Angeles Times, September 6, 1945. 
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Supporters of the amendment were naturally unable to 
accept the conclusion which the Finance Committee reached. 
Some, like the younger La Follette (Progressive-Wisconsin), 
felt that the opinions which the states had rendered were 
only those of entrenched interests seeking to preserve the 
status quo and that the best course which Congress could 
take would be simply to ignore them. He asked Congress 
. . are we interested in what is the opinion of the 
governor's of the forty-eight states, or are we interested 
in the plight of the unemployed?" Additional remarks by 
La Follette indicate that he had concluded that since the 
unemployment of reconversion was a national problem it was 
up to Congress to initiate programs to ameliorate its effect 
and to forget about what the states might think. 
Others had a more sophisticated legal answer to the 
states' claims that they could not participate. The minority 
opinion of the Committee on Finance, written by Joseph H. 
Guffey (Democrat-Pennsylvania), cited the legal opinion of 
the Social Security Board which found that provisions of 
all the state laws relating to the question were practically 
identical, and that these laws were not written with the 
intent of preventing supplemental payments, but rather to 
prevent duplicate payments. The Social Security Board 
S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, Septem­
ber 20, 1945, p. 8964. 
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concluded that, as a rule, the states did have the legal 
authority to participate in the program called for by 
Senate Resolution 1274. The minority position saw a dan­
gerous precedent in the Finance Committee's decision to 
omit the supplemental payments provision on the basis of 
the assertion of those states which said they had no legal 
authority to participate--it was feared that no matter what 
the provisions of a Congressional proposal might be that 
the states could kill it simply by denying that they could 
legally participate. Guffey further argued that Congress 
must do what it could to provide all possible benefit to 
those states which said they could participate. If Congress 
implemented the program in those states which wanted it, then 
the states which gave adverse opinions would be allowed to 
review those opinions, and, in the event of a change of 
attitude, opt for participation in the program, calling 
special sessions of their legislatures if necessary to rid 
themselves of what Guffey termed "self-inflicted difficul­
ties."^'' A minority report often represents fundamental dis­
agreement, and these legal arguments were structured to defend 
the interests involved; so it is to the social arguments which 
were made that one must turn to gain a deeper understanding 
S., Congress, Senate. Emergency Unemployment Compen-
sation. Report No. 565, No. 2, Senate Minority views of Mr. 
Guttey from the Committee on Finance pursuant to S. 1274, 79th 
Congress, 1st Sess. (Hereinafter referred to as Unemployment 
Compensation, Report No, 565, No. 2.). 
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of the issue. 
Just how much unemployment was to be expected? The 
figures differed with the sources and quite naturally those 
who favored increasing federal assistance cited much higher 
figures: Labor officials and'representatives of the execu­
tive branch testified before the House Ways and Means Com­
mittee and the Senate Finance Committee during the last week 
of April, 1945 that unemployment might reach eight million by 
the next spring before gradually reconverting industry would 
1 fi lessen the situation. ° The War Manpower Commission estimated 
that unemployment might reach seven and a half million during 
the year after V-J day.^^ Such estimates certainly provided 
data to support measures like the administration supported 
Murray-Kilgore Bill. Local situations also indicated serious 
increases in unemployment-- in Murray's home state the Great 
Falls Tribune stated on December 17, 1945 that the number of 
unemployment claims had doubled in the previous two months 
and that local officials speculated that the increase was 
caused by war workers who were migrating back home after hav­
ing left Montana to work in war production centers. 
Those who were opposed to emergency measures like the 
Murray-Kilgore Bill had their own interpretations of the 
^^washington Post, September 5, 1945. 
S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, July 17, 
1945, p. 7715. 
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unemployment situation. The Wall Street Journal editorialized 
that the need for supplementary provisions "as an emergency 
measure is not at all clear." The states, the newspaper sug­
gested, could likely handle any unemployment problems if 
Congress and executive agencies would concentrate their efforts 
on industrial reconversion,In another issue the editor 
stated that although the nation may have millions unemployed 
there were hundreds of thousands of jobs "going begging" and 
that already existing systems of unemployment compensation 
were, in part, responsible for these jobs being unfilled. 
The Washington Post saw no need for increased unemployment 
compensation because of a number of economic factors which 
would contribute to post-war economic prosperity, including 
low money rates, increased agricultural production, increased 
residential construction, increased railroad business, and 
2 2 increased demand for civilian goods. An economist employed 
by the United States Chamber of Commerce in testifying against 
the use of federal funds to increase compensation predicted 
that "a great boom is pending." This boom would be the 
natural result of unprecedented purchasing power stored up 
during the war. "I am not predicting its indefinite con-
20Editorial, Wall Street Journal, September 12, 1945. 
^^Ibid., September 6, 1945. 
22Roger W. Babson, "Transition Ahead," Washington Post, 
January 1, 194 5. 
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tinuation, although I think it will continue for several 
years: Unwise reconversion and labor policies could do 
much to halt it."^^ Since no one could say for certain 
how much post-war unemployment the country would experience 
it was difficult to say how badly unemployment compensation 
needed federal supplementation--at least insofar as it needed 
supplementation as an emergency measure within the recon­
version program. 
There was also considerable disagreement as to whether 
states possessed adequate resources to meet post-war unemploy­
ment problems. Proponents of the Murray-Kilgore Bill (S. 1274) 
tended to argue that state funds were inadequate, or that even 
if adequate the states would defeat the purpose for which 
unemployment compensation was originally established by hoard­
ing the funds.Opponents, in turn, would argue that it was 
illogical for the federal government to provide supplementary 
funds since the national debt had increased during the war 
while the states had become more prosperous; and that state 
funds were entirely adequate, totalling some five billion 
7 ̂ dollars and increasing steadily.This question was obviously 
related to how much unemployment could be expected. 
^^Philadelphia Record. September 5, 1945. 
24u. S., Congress, Congressional Digest, December, 1944, 
p. 291. U. S., Congress, Senate, Senator Wagner speaking. 
Congressional Record, September 19, 1945, p. 8881. 
25Editorial. New York Herald Tribune, September 12, 
1945. It is, of course, a non-Keynsian and highly dubious 
argument to flatly equate a high national debt with financial 
weakness. U,S,, Congress, Congressional Digest, December, 1944. 
p. 291. 
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How adequate were the state benefits? Supporters of 
the Murray-Kilgore Bill and other similar measures thought 
an increase in both the amount and duration of payments was 
entirely justified. The Murray-Kilgore Bill would have 
established a $25 dollar per week maximum for a period of 
26 weeks. Kilgore cited the existing benefits as ranging 
from $12 to $22 per week and called the situation harmful 
in that it allowed "the income of the many to fall too low."^^ 
Testimony before the Senate Finance Committee indicated that 
a quarter of the states had not raised their standards for 
2 8 ten years. By establishing federal standards it was hoped 
that gross inequalities would be mitigated--average weekly 
earnings in the Territory of Alaska were $93.45 per week in 
1944 while the unemployment compensation ceiling was $16; 
in California the average weekly earnings were $51.97 and 
the ceiling $20.^^ Those who favored the $26 ceiling felt 
that the state increases had been very limited in real terms--
that payments had not kept up with the inflationary spiral 
indicated by the Bureau of Labor statistics showing the cost 
of living index in May of 1945 some 28 per cent over the 
26washington Post. September 11, 1945. 
S., Congress, Congressional Digest, December, 
1944, pp. 301, 303. 
28u. S., Senate, Unemployment Compensation. Report No. 
565, No. 2. 
S., Congress, Senate. Congressional Record, 
September 19, 1945, p. 8891. 
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1935-1939 average. The need was seen as being even more 
urgent when it was realized that prices o£ food and cloth­
ing which represent a large part o£ the average family's 
expense had risen 30 and 44 per cent during the same per-
iod.30 
Opponents of measures like the Murray-Kilgore Bill 
argued that states were taking care of the problem them­
selves and federal effort was not required--that forty-five 
state legislatures met in 1945 and that twenty-five had in­
creased both benefits and the duration of those benefits, 
a n d  t h a t  t h i r t y - t w o  h a d  i n c r e a s e d  o n e  o r  t h e  o t h e r . T h e y  
saw each state as being the best judge of its own conditions: 
Maryland officials noted that their legislature had rendered 
judgment that twenty dollars a week for twenty-six weeks was 
right and proper and that additional federal assistance was 
not necessary.If the liberals could argue that a federal 
supplement was required to keep up with inflation then the 
Wall Street Journal would have no trouble arguing against such 
a proposal on the grounds that it was inflationary in itself 
33 in that it increased federal spending. Inevitably the 
S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 
July 17, 1945, p. 8963. 
S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record. 
September 20, 1945, p. 8962. 
^^Editorial. Washington Post, September 12, 1945. 
^^Editorial. V/all Street Journal, May 31, 1945. 
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argument that increased compensation would foster increased 
indolence appeared. A New York Times editorial read: 
It has been pointed out that a benefit of twenty-
five dollars a week is equivalent to sixty-three 
cents an hour for a forty hour week. In some 
states this is certainly going to be considered 
a pretty generous sum for not working six months 
of the year. The offer of a job, at, say 75 cents 
an hour will be regarded by many persons on 
unemployment compensation as an offer of only 
12 cents an hour for actively working. It may 
be less than this, as unemployment compensation 
benefits are tax free, while the wages to which 
they are related are subject to income tax.^^ 
Who should be covered by state benefits? One of the pro­
visions which President Roosevelt and Murray believed should 
have been in the War Mobilization and Reconversion Act was 
that deleted section providing for unemployment compensation 
for federal workers. This is one of the things for which 
Murray's amendment (Senate Resolution 1274) would have pro­
vided. As the Social Security System was then functioning 
only war workers employed by private concerns engaged in the 
execution of government war contracts were eligible to re­
ceive unemployment compensation. Workers in government-owned 
plants were not eligible because the federal government was 
not, and could not be, taxed in order to contribute to the 
fund for unemployment compensation. Workers in federal agencies 
not engaged in war production were in the same situation except 
that under Civil Service Regulations they might be able to 
^^Editorial. New York Times, September 20, 1945. 
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withdraw some of the funds which they had contributed to the 
retirement fund. Maritime workers were not able to draw 
unemployment compensation under the Social Security Act 
because it had been decided that it would be impossible to 
T r 
administer the system for them.*'^ 
Senator Wagner said that these categories of uncovered 
individuals totalled some three million federal employees 
•7 
and 150,000 merchant marines. One of the reasons Murray 
favored extending coverage to federal employees during the 
reconversion period was because he believed it was the 
responsibility of the federal government to aid those who 
had engaged in war work. Had his amendment to the War 
Mobilization and Reconversion Act been accepted a trans­
portation allowance to help workers relocate to new employ-
37 
ment situations would also have been created. The prin­
cipal objection raised to the transportation allowances was 
that it would be impossible to determine who really needed 
•Z O 
such an allowance and thus prevent abuse of the system. 
The final point of conflict was whether the proposed 
federal supplement would have meant increased federalization^ 
S., Congress, Congressional Digest, December, 1944, 
p. 295. 
^^Ibid., p. 296. 
S. Senate, Unemployment Compensation, Report No. 
565. 
S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 
September 20, 1945, p. 8962, 
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of the program over the long-run even though Murray and 
other sponsors had presented it as a temporary emergency 
measure. Murray acknowledged that in seeking an answer 
to unequal and often inadequate state benefits it was 
difficult to frame "adequate" legislation short of feder­
alizing the whole program.Critics of measures like 
Senate Resolution 1274 argued that while such legislation 
was ostensibly designed to meet an emergency situation if 
it did pass, it would as a practical matter mean increased 
federal control. The Washington Post editorialized: 
The Kilgore Emergency Unemployment Insurance 
Bill, not serviced and strongly supported by 
the Administration ... is the forerunner of 
radical changes in the country's system of un­
employment insurance . . . whatever the bills 
several objectives may be, it is undeniably a 
first, and a long step toward federalizing our 
unemployment insurance. This is an undesirable 
and unnecessary step, politically and indus­
trially. The states have handled their admin­
istrative problems efficiently. The reconver­
sion decisions which need to iDe made in the 
next three months--and in the next three years--
had best be made by officials close to the local 
conditions. There is nothing in the record to 
support the view that authorities in Washington 
are nearly so qualified by experience and respon­
sibility, to make these decisions as are the men 
on the spot .... There can be no national 
standards of benefits that does not lead surely 
and swiftly to national standards of wages and 
working conditions.^® 
39Memo, dated May 3, 1945, Murray Papers. 
40Leo Wolman, Editorial, Washington Post, September 7, 
1945. 
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A New York Times editorial presented the same view: 
Mr. Truman insists that this is merely an 
emergency program, which will leave unemploy­
ment compensation with the states. No one who 
knows anything o£ practical politics can ser­
iously believe that any state, once having its 
benefit payments increased or lengthened, 
could on July 1, 1947, in fact return to its 
former smaller or shorter benefit payments. 
Those who wish a uniform scale of benefits 
throughout the country, with the federal 
government supplying funds to make it pos­
sible, should logically (and many of them do 
in fact) prefer an outright federalized 
system.41 
Though it would seem to this writer that, given the context 
of Murray's political outlook, he would have favored feder­
alizing the whole program he also realized that the only hope 
for increased benefit to the unemployed during the recon­
version period was through the adoption of an "emergency" 
program. 
One of the difficulties which beset the Murray-Kilgore 
Bill came in the form of an amendment sponsored by Senator 
Lucas (Democrat-Illinois) which would have returned all 
employment facilities and personnel of the United States 
Employment Service (U.S.E.S.) to the states. This action 
would have been in defiance of President Truman's expressed 
wishes to Congressand that it was introduced by Lucas 
caught some off-guard since he was considered a strong 
^^Editorial, New York Times, September 20, 1945. 
^^Editorial, Times-Herald CWashington, D.C.), Septem­
ber 19, 1945. 
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administration supporter and was on record as favoring 
federalization of the whole unemployment program! The 
states had loaned unemployment services to the federal 
government early in the war and Truman had specifically 
asked Congress to continue this arrangement until June 
of 1947 and had further requested that appropriations 
to these services be increased due to what he perceived 
as an emergency situation. The Lucas amendment would 
have required that with the passage of the Murray-Kilgore 
Bill the services of the United States Employment Service 
be returned to the states within ninety days. This was 
disconcerting to those members of Congress who thought 
unemployment had become a national rather than a state 
concern during reconversion.'^^ 
When the War Contract Settlement Act was passed the 
liberal 'bloc' in the Senate had pledged that when Congress 
re-convened they would be able to do something about the 
"human problems" of reconversion.'^^ Insofar as increasing 
unemployment compensation was one of their goals they failed. 
This failure was not only a failure for the progressive forces 
in the Senate but was the first major legislative defeat of 
President Truman who unequivocally favored federal supple-
S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 
September 17, 1945, p. 8874. 
S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 
September 19, 1945, p. 8888. 
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mentation of welfare payments both as President and as a 
Senator,^ ̂ 
Murray was convinced that dismissal wages were not 
the answer to the unemployment problems of reconversion--
he feared that dismissal wages would discriminate between 
d. fi 
war workers and others in an unfair manner. Strengthening 
the unemployment compensation system with federal funds was 
only a partial answer to unemployment problems, designed as 
an emergency measure it would only increase the workers 
security for a temporary period, IVhat Murray envisioned 
was an employment act which would guarantee every worker 
a job. He viewed it as a companion bill to increased un­
employment compensation. Here, too, the liberals were to 
see a main focus of their effort pass away without gain as 
the provision providing for a guarantee of a job was sacri­
ficed to the forces of compromise. 
^^Thomas Stokes, Editorial, News (Washington, D.C.), 
May 31, 1945. 
^^Memo, May 3, 1944, Murray Papers. 
^^The original version of the Employment Act of 1946, 
section 2 (b) read: "All Americans able to work and seeking 
work have the right to useful, remunerative, regular and 
full-time employment, it is the policy of the United States 
to assure the existence at all times of sufficient employ­
ment opportunities to enable all Americans who have finished 
their schooling and who do not have full-time housekeeping 
responsibilities freely to exercize this right." Bailey, 
Appendix A, p. 243. 
When Truman signed the bill into law it had been changed 
to read, "The Congress hereby declares that it is the con­
tinuing policy and responsibility of the Federal government 
72 
Murray and other liberals thought federal action was 
necessary to correct the disparity between the payments of 
the states and to raise the standards of those payments. 
Since only one state had acted towards development an unemploy­
ment compensation system prior to the Social Security Act of 
1935, why, they asked, should it be expected that the states 
would provide adequate benefits?^® The problems which would 
stem from raising benefits through federal legislation without 
federalizing the entire program were also clear to Murray. 
He realized how difficult it would be politically for the 
states to lower benefits once they had been significantly 
raised. 
to use all practicable means ... to foster and promote 
free competitive enterprise and the general welfare, condi­
tions under which there will be afforded useful employment, 
for those able, willing, and seeking to work, and to promote 
maximum employment, production and purchasing power." 
Bailey, p. 228, 
48u. S.. Senate, Unemployment Compensation, Report No. 
565, No. 2. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
John Snyder, Director of War Management and Reconver­
sion, stated in an October 1, 1945 report to Congress that 
"There can be no doubt that thorough preparation by both 
business and Government has saved us months o£ time and 
billions of dollars; it will reduce the amount of unemploy­
ment."^ There can also be no doubt as to the significant 
role James Murray played in this success. It is also true 
that Murray and other liberals failed to achieve some of 
the goals which they thought should have been a part of 
reconversion policy. Of the three areas with which Murray 
was most concerned it seems clear that he and other liberals 
were usually successful in shaping policy the way they de­
sired in war contract termination and surplus property dis­
posal; however, these were matters on which there existed 
widespread consensus on what policy should be established. 
This is to say that although Murray was influential in develop­
ing policy in these areas, the policy that he did help to 
develop was not radically different from what someone more 
lU. S. Office of War Management and Reconversion, Pro­
duction Jobs, Market, 4th Report to the President, the Senate 
and House o± Representatives by the Director of 0. W. M. and 
R. John Snyder, October 1, 1945. 
73 
74 
to the right of the political spectrum would have presented 
had he been in Murray's position. In regard to increasing 
unemployment compensation with federal funds, an issue which 
was considerably more controversial, the failure of the 
liberals seems equally clear. 
There were a number of perspectives from which Murray 
viewed reconversion: He saw it as a struggle between the 
interests of big business vs. small business and labor. He 
repeatedly voiced fears that "special interest groups," 
which he most often equated with big business, would influ­
ence adjustment policy unfairly in their favor. He betrayed 
a deep suspicion of what has come to be known as the "military 
mind" and its influence on public policy. With Murray one 
sees an individual interested in a continuation of the New 
Deal political philosophy into the post-war world. One fre­
quently sees a legislator limited by the "system"--of a very 
liberal ideology straining at the limits of tradition, at the 
limits of what public opinion will tolerate. 
Compromise is endemic to the American political process 
but it seems to have been demonstrated in a particularly graphic 
manner in Murray's case as he worked hard for a temporary fed­
eral supplement to unemployment compensation while really 
favoring complete federalization of the entire program; as 
he eliminated unemployment compensation from the War Contract 
Settlement Act because he realized it was the only way it could 
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be passed even though he favored an omnibus reconversion bill 
which would have attacked all the problems; as he helped to 
produce the type of legislation needed to keep the economy in 
high gear, and yet was largely stymied in his- efforts to 
create that "human side" of reconversion which he felt was 
more important. Murray would have liked to have seen govern­
ment planning on a much larger scale but he realized that the 
public was not yet prepared to accept such extensive planning. 
In Murray^s opinion the pendulum of executive-legislative 
power had swung too far towards the executive during the war 
years and the problems of reconversion were something that 
Congress should have the final say on in order that the leg­
islative branch might regain its proper law-making function. 
In some part this increased Congressional initiative stemmed 
from executive failures --Murray did not want a repeat of the 
chaos which accompanied the World War I experience when the 
executive branch controlled reconversion, and he did not favor 
some of the principles and priorities which he thought an all 
too business-oriented executive apparatus was utilizing in the 
termination of World War II contracts. Senate war-time sub­
committees like those of Murray and Truman did a good deal to 
point up these executive inadequacies. 
Much of the controversy which has surrounded the proper 
balance between legislative and executive power of administration 
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stems from ambiguities within the Constitution.^ The type of 
Congressional surveillance of the executive that appeared in 
the War Contract Settlement Act became the stated legal re­
sponsibility of all committees with the Legislative Reorganiza­
tion Act of 1946: 
To assist Congress in appraising the admin­
istration of the laws . . . each standing com­
mittee of the Senate and House of Representatives 
shall exercize continuous watchfulness of the 
execution by the administrative agencies con­
cerned of any laws, the subject matter of which 
is within the jurisdiction of such committee.^ 
Essentially what Murray wanted to see was that same respon­
sible Congress which Woodrow Wilson had argued for in Congres­
sional Government: 
If the people could have, through Congress, 
daily knowledge of all the more important 
transactions of the government offices, an 
insight into all that now seems withheld and 
private, their confidence in the executive, 
now so often shaken, would, I think be very 
soon established. 
Unless Congress have and use every means 
of acquainting itself with acts and the dis­
position of the administrative agents of the 
government, the country must be helpless to 
learn how it is being served; and unless 
Congress both scrutinize these things and 
sift them by every form of discussion, the 
country must remain in embarrassing, crip­
pling ignorance of the very affairs which 
it is most important that it understand and 
^See David Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), p"! 404. 
^Quoted in William L. Morrow, Congressional Government 
(New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1969), p. 189. 
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direct.^ 
The importance of reconversion had become very clear 
to the public in the presidential campaign of 1944, and it 
continued to be an issue through 1952 when Eisenhower claimed 
that the Korean situation had, in part, been caused by Truman's 
demobilizing too fast.^ (The criticism loses some of its power 
when it is remembered that the Republican candidate in 1948, 
Thomas Dewey, had suggested that demobilization was not taking 
place fast enough.)^ Although reconversion remained an issue 
through the 1952 election its importance had dwindled: Robert 
E. Lane believes it to be clear that the reason the 1944 
election was seen as a much more important contest than the 
1952 election is because people were so concerned about eco-
7 nomic questions which hinged upon reconversion issues. The 
''^Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1900)^ pp. 2 99, 303. 
^A. J. Muller, Adlai Stevenson: A Study in Values (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1967), pT 110. 
^Ibid.. p. 111. This is not to say that Eisenhower's 
statement is completely invalidated by Dewey's earlier remarks--
Eisenhower's remarks must stand on their own merit--rather it 
means that there was a loss of power in terms of the validity 
of the statement as an attack on the Democrats. (The intent 
here is to note a logical contradiction, and not to make any 
sort of assertion about a real loss of political power which 
may, or may not have occurred — it is not known how many of the 
voters in 1952 were aware of Dewey^s remarks of four years 
earlier, or how they logically related the two statements if 
they were aware of them.) 
^Robert E. Lane, "The Politics of Consensus in an Age 
of Affluence" in Political Man (New York: Free Press, 1972), 
pp. 228-229. "The implication is clear: people were carrying 
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importance of reconversion is further emphasized by Harold 
Stein's observation that in 1944 "practically all the chief 
participants in the reconversion controversy were mentioned, 
publically or privately, as Vice-Presidential nominees."® 
This list of individuals who were seriously considered included 
Truman, who had become recognized as a very effective Senator 
through his role as Chairman of the Special Senate Committee 
to Investigate War Management and Reconversion. It seems 
reasonable to assume that Murray would have received some 
consideration for the Vice-Presidency had he not been ineli­
gible under the Constitution, having been born in Canada and 
into the 1944 election--when postwar reconversion anxieties 
loomed-- their sense of partisan alarm learned in the 1930's. 
In 1952, with the war in the Far East still unresolved, and the 
cold war in full swing, the sense that the country's welfare 
hinged on the election nevertheless dwindled drastically." 
The following table is used by Lane to summarize the data 
he has collected from several sources regarding this question 
of voter perception of the importance of the elections of 
1944 and 1952: 
1944 1952 
October November 
Very important to the country: 54 21 20 
Country will be better off: 34 40 42 
Some difference; it depends: 
Won't make much difference; 
no difference: 9 32 . 
Lane seems right in stressing the importance of economic 
anxiety in making the election of 1944 one of such great con­
cern. However, if further data were available in the form of 
questions which separated the economic from other possible in­
fluences in making the election of 1944 one of greater concern 
then Lane's case would be a stronger one. Was not World War II 
a source of greater concern to the average American than the 
Korean War? Can it be assumed that the only criteria that the 
voters judge presidential candidates by is their position on 
economic issues? In over-stating his argument Lane seems to be 
sweeping other sources of public concern under the rug. 
®Stein, Public Administration and Public Policy, p. 247. 
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become a United States citizen through naturalization.^ 
Murray's work in reconversion should be considered a 
very important part of his career in the Senate (1935-1961) . 
Murray was the most important figure in Congress insofar as 
reconversion policy is concerned. His record, however, was 
one of mixed results. His ability to shape policy about which 
basic consensus prevailed testifies to the significant posi­
tion which he occupied in the Senate; just as the rejection 
of measures which provided for federal supplementation of 
unemployment compensation seems to signal an indication of 
a failure to induce Congress to take certain steps which 
Murray and other liberals regarded as important in terms of 
promoting social justice during the reconversion period. 
9Who*s Who in America. 1944-45, Volume XXIII (Chicago: 
Marquis Publications, 1945). 
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